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Abstract
In this paper we study continuous-time two-player zero-sum optimal switching
games on a finite horizon. Using the theory of doubly reflected BSDEs with inter-
connected barriers, we show that this game has a value and an equilibrium in the
players’ switching controls.
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1 Zero-sum optimal switching game
Optimal switching is a generalisation of optimal stopping which has various applications
in economics and mathematical finance. It consists of one or more agents and a system
which they control by successively switching the system’s operational mode according
to a discrete set of choices. There are several works on optimal switching problems
in continuous time, and a survey of the literature identifies two main approaches: an
analytical approach using partial differential equations (PDEs) and a probabilistic one.
Methods based on PDEs and associated variational inequalities appeared as early as
the 1970s, under the topic of impulsive control for diffusion processes (see [1] and the
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references therein). A viscosity solutions approach to this type of PDE appeared in the
late 1980s to early 1990s (for instance, [2]) and is still the topic of active research [3].
Probabilistic solution methods were being applied since the 1970s and 1980s in various
degrees of generality (see [1, 4, 5, 6, 7] for instance), and most of the recent research in
this area has been a combination of the martingale approach via Snell envelopes ([8, 9])
and the theory of backward stochastic differential equations (BSDE) ([10, 11, 12]).
All of the aforementioned references are concerned with single-person optimisation
problems. Multiple-person optimal switching problems in a stochastic setting, the topic
under which the present work falls, have been studied less frequently in the literature
(there is related work for deterministic systems such as [13, 14]). In the zero-sum setting
there are previous works in continuous time including [15, 16, 17] and, if viewed as a
special case of impulse control games, [18, 19].
From the probabilistic point of view, the zero-sum switching game leads to the study
of the following system of reflected BSDEs with inter-connected bilateral obstacles: Find
a system of processes (Y i,j, Zi,j, Ki,j)(i,j)∈Γ such that for any (i, j) ∈ Γ and s ∈ [0, T ],
(i) Y i,js = h
i,j +
∫ T
s
f i,jt dt+K
i,j
T −Ki,js −
∫ T
s
Zi,jt dBt ;
(ii) Y i,js ≤ U i,js (Y ) and Y i,js ≥ Li,js (Y ) ;
(iii)
∫ T
s
(Y i,jt − U i,jt (Y ))dKi,j,−t =
∫ T
s
(Li,jt (Y )− Y i,jt )dKi,j,+t = 0,
(1.1)
where: i) Γ1 = {1, ...m1} and Γ2 = {1, ...m2} are operational modes controlled by players
1 and 2 respectively, and Γ = Γ1×Γ2 is the set of operational modes for the system; ii) f i,j,
gˆi,k and gˇj,` (resp. hi,j) are given stochastic processes (resp. random variables) defining the
game’s economic data; iii) Ki,j is a finite variation process and Ki,j,± are the increasing
processes in its orthogonal decomposition Ki,j := Ki,j,+ − Ki,j,−; iv) Y = (Y i,j)(i,j)∈Γ,
Li,js (Y ) := maxk 6=i,k∈Γ1{Y k,js − gˆi,ks } and U i,js (Y ) := min`6=j,j∈Γ2{Y i,`s + gˇj,`s }.
In the diffusion framework, randomness stems from an Rk-valued diffusion process
Xs,x := (Xs,xt )s≤t≤T , (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk is fixed, which satisfies:{
∀t ∈ [s, T ], Xs,xt = x+
∫ t
s
b(r,Xs,xr )dr +
∫ t
s
σ(r,Xs,xr )dBr;
Xs,xr = x, r ∈ [0, s].
(1.2)
In this setting, the system (1.1) is connected to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
system of PDEs with obstacles: For any (i, j) ∈ Γ and (s, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rk,
min
{
vi,j(s, x)− Li,j(v)(s, x) , max{vi,j(s, x)− U i,j(v)(s, x),(−∂s − LX)(vi,j)(s, x)− f i,j(s, x)}} = 0 ;
vi,j(T, x) = hi,j(x),
(1.3)
where LX is the generator associated withXs,x; v = (vi,j)(i,j)∈Γ, Li,j(v) := maxk 6=i,k∈Γ1{vk,j−
gˆi,k} and U i,j(v) := min 6`=j,j∈Γ2{vi,` + gˇj,`}; f i,j, hi,j, gˆi,k and gˇj,` are deterministic func-
tions.
System (1.1) is studied, for example, in [16] where it is shown that the solution exists
when gˇj,` and gˆi,k are constant. In the diffusion framework, it is also studied in [17] where
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the authors have shown that the solution exists and is unique under rather mild regularity
assumptions on the data. The connection, through the usual Feynman-Kac formula, with
the viscosity solution to the system of PDEs (1.3) is also established. However, the
interpretation of Y i,j (or vi,j) as the value of the underlying zero-sum switching game, as
might be expected, is stated only in the case when f i,j and hi,j are separated with respect
to i and j: f i,j = f i1 + f
j
2 and h
i,j = hi1 + h
j
2. The case when f
i,j or hi,j are not separated
is still open, and its resolution is the main objective of this work. In particular, we show
that the solution of system (1.1), when it exists (for example, in the diffusion framework),
coincides with the value function of the zero-sum switching game. As a result, the unique
viscosity solution to the system of PDEs (1.3) coincides with the value function of the
associated zero-sum switching game.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the zero-sum switching
game. In Section 3, we show the main result, that Y i,j coincides with the value of the
zero-sum game. Moreover, we provide results on the existence of optimal strategies in the
game. For completeness, we also interpret our findings in the diffusion framework.
2 Probabilistic setup and notation
We follow closely the setup in [17], working on a finite horizon [0, T ] and filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,F,P) where F = (Ft)0≤t≤T is the usual completion of the natural filtration of
B = (Bt)0≤t≤T , a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion.
• Let T be the set of F-stopping times bounded above by T , and for a given ν ∈ T ,
Tν the set of all τ ∈ T satisfying τ ≥ ν a.s.
• For any sub-σ-algebra Fˆ of F , let Lp(Fˆ), 1 ≤ p <∞, denote the set of p-integrable
Fˆ -measurable random variables, and set Lp := Lp(F).
• Let H2 be the set of F-progressively measurable processes w = (wt)0≤t≤T satisfying,
E
[∫ T
0
(wt)
2dt
]
< +∞.
• Let S2 be the set of F-adapted processes w = (wt)0≤t≤T with paths that are right-
continuous with left limits satisfying,
sup
0≤t≤T
|wt| ∈ L2.
Let S2c ⊂ S2 denote the subset of processes w ∈ S2 with continuous paths.
• Let K2 denote the set of F-adapted right-continuous with left limits processes K of
finite variation satisfying K0 = 0 and,∫ T
0
|dKt| ∈ L2,
where |dKt(ω)| is the total variation measure on [0, T ]. Let K2c denote the subset of
processes K ∈ K2 with continuous paths.
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Definition 1. Let Y be a right-continuous with left limits semi-martingale having de-
composition Yt = Y0 +Mt +Kt where M is a local martingale, K has finite variation, and
M0 = K0 = 0. Note that M is continuous due to the choice of filtration F (see Lemma
14.5.2 of [20]). We say that Y is square-integrable and write Y ∈ W2 if
Y0 ∈ L2,M ∈ S2 and K ∈ K2.
If Y is continuous then we write Y ∈ W2c .
Let S2,mc denote the m-product of S2c . Similarly we define H2,m, L2,m, S2,m, K2,m, . . . ,
for the m-products of the spaces H2, L2, S2, K2, and so on.
2.1 Costs, rewards and switching controls
Let Γk = {1, . . . ,mk}, k ∈ {1, 2}, be a finite, discrete set representing the operating modes
that player k can choose. Let Γ = Γ1 × Γ2 denote the product space of operating modes
γ = (γ(1), γ(2)), having cardinality |Γ| = m = m1 ×m2.
• For (i, j) ∈ Γ, f i,j ∈ H2 defines a running reward paid by player 2 to player 1 and
hi,j ∈ L2(FT ) a terminal reward paid by player 2 to player 1, when player 1’s (resp.
player 2’s) active mode is i (resp. j).
• For i1, i2 ∈ Γ1, gˆi1,i2 ∈ S2c defines a non-negative payment from player 1 to player 2
when the former switches from i1 to i2.
• For j1, j2 ∈ Γ2, gˇj1,j2 ∈ S2c defines a non-negative payment from player 2 to player 1
when the former switches from mode j1 to j2.
For all (i, j) ∈ Γ and t ∈ [0, T ] we set gˆi,it = gˇj,jt = 0.
2.1.1 Individual switching controls and strategies
Definition 2 (Switching controls and their indicator functions). A control for player 1
is a sequence α = (σn, ξn)n≥0 such that,
1. for all n ≥ 0, σn ∈ T and is such that σn ≤ σn+1, P-a.s., and P({σn < T ∀n ≥
0}) = 0;
2. for all n ≥ 0, ξn is an Fσn-measurable Γ1-valued random variable;
3. for n ≥ 1, on {σn < T} we have σn < σn+1 and ξn 6= ξn−1, while on {σn = T} we
have ξn = ξn−1.
Let A denote the set of controls for player 1. The set B of controls β = (τn, ζn)n≥0 for
player 2, where the ζn are Γ
2-valued, is defined analogously. Denoting by CαN the cost of
the first N ≥ 1 switches,
CαN :=
N∑
n=1
gˆξn−1,ξnσn ,
note that the limit lim
N→∞
CαN is well defined.
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Definition 3. A control α ∈ A for player 1 is said to be square-integrable if,
lim
N→∞
CαN ∈ L2.
Let A denote the set of such controls. Similarly, the set B of square-integrable controls
for player 2 consists of those β ∈ B satisfying,
lim
N→∞
CβN ∈ L2,
where
CβN :=
N∑
n=1
gˇζn−1,ζnτn .
Definition 4 (Non-anticipative switching strategies). Let s ∈ [0, T ] and ν ∈ Ts. Two
controls α1, α2 ∈ A with α1 = (σ1n, ξ1n)n≥0 and α2 = (σ2n, ξ2n)n≥0 are said to be equivalent,
denoting this by α1 ≡ α2, on [s, ν] if we have a.s.,
ξ101[σ10 ,σ11 ](t) +
∑
n≥1
ξ1n1(σ1n,σ1n+1](t) = ξ
2
01[σ20 ,σ21 ](t) +
∑
n≥1
ξ2n1(σ2n,σ2n+1](t), s ≤ t ≤ ν.
A non-anticipative strategy for player 1 is a mapping α : B→ A such that:
• Non-anticipativity: for any s ∈ [0, T ], ν ∈ Ts, and β1, β2 ∈ B such that β1 ≡ β2 on
[s, ν], we have α(β1) ≡ α(β2) on [s, ν].
• Square-integrability: for any β ∈ B we have α(β) ∈ A.
In a similar manner we define non-anticipative strategies for player 2. Let A and B
denote the set of non-anticipative strategies for players 1 and 2 respectively.
Definition 5. For s ∈ [0, T ] and i ∈ Γ1, let Ais denote the set of controls α ∈ A satisfying
ξ0 = i and σ0 = s. Similarly, define B
j
s for s ∈ [0, T ] and j ∈ Γ2. Analogous notation will
be used below for other classes of controls, for example square-integrable controls Ais, Bjs,
and strategies A is , B
j
s.
2.1.2 Coupling of controls
We now define the coupling of two controls α ∈ A and β ∈ B under the following assump-
tion: player 1’s switch is implemented first if both players decide to switch at the same
instant.
Definition 6. Given controls α ∈ A and β ∈ B, define the coupling γ(α, β) = (ρn, γn)n≥0
where ρn ∈ T is defined by,
ρn = σrn ∧ τsn , (2.1)
with r0 = s0 = 0, r1 = s1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2,
rn = rn−1 + 1{σrn−1≤ τsn−1}, sn = sn−1 + 1{τsn−1<σrn−1},
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and γn is a Γ-valued random variable such that γ0 = (ξ0, ζ0) and for n ≥ 1,
γn =

(
ξrn , γ
(2)
n−1
)
, on {σrn ≤ τsn , σrn < T}(
γ
(1)
n−1, ζsn
)
, on {τsn < σrn}
γn−1, on {τsn = σrn = T}.
(2.2)
Define for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
ut = γ01[ρ0,ρ1](t) +
∑
n≥1
γn1(ρn,ρn+1](t), (2.3)
where (ρn, ρn+1] = ∅ on {ρn = ρn+1}.
Note that the coupling γ(α, β) = (ρn, γn)n≥0 of the controls α ∈ Ais and β ∈ Bjs has
the following properties:
1. ρ0 = s and for all n ≥ 0 we have ρn ∈ T and ρn ≤ ρn+1 P-a.s., and P({ρn < T ∀n ≥
0}) = 0;
2. γ0 = (i, j) and for all n ≥ 0 the random variable γn is Fρn-measurable, Γ-valued
and γn+1 6= γn on {ρn+1 < T}.
Write C
γ(α,β)
N for the joint cumulative cost of the first N switches,
C
γ(α,β)
N =
N∑
n=1
[
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn − gˇγ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn
]
, N ≥ 1.
Definition 7. The coupling γ(α, β) = (ρn, γn)n≥0 of the controls α ∈ Ais and β ∈ Bjs is
said to be admissible, writing γ(α, β) ∈ Gi,js to indicate this, if supN≥1
∣∣Cγ(α,β)N ∣∣ ∈ L2.
Note that for every α ∈ A and β ∈ B we have lim
N→∞
C
γ(α,β)
N = lim
N→∞
CαN − lim
N→∞
CβN .
Using the triangle inequality, we see that every pair of square-integrable controls (α, β),
α ∈ Ais and β ∈ Bjs, satisfies γ(α, β) ∈ Gi,js .
2.2 The zero-sum switching game
For the zero-sum game we assume that player 1 is the maximiser and define the total
reward from its perspective. Letting (s, i, j) ∈ [0, T )× Γ be the initial state and recalling
(2.3), we have
J i,js (γ(α, β)) = E
[∫ T
s
futt dt−
∞∑
n=1
[
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn − gˇγ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn
]
+ huT
∣∣∣ Fs] ,
α ∈ Ais, β ∈ Bjs. (2.4)
The lower and upper values for this game, denoted respectively by Vˇ i,js and Vˆ
i,j
s , are
defined as follows: 
Vˇ i,js := ess sup
α∈Ais
ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js (γ(α, β))
Vˆ i,js := ess inf
β∈Bjs
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js (γ(α, β)).
(2.5)
Note that Vˇ i,js ≤ Vˆ i,js a.s.
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Definition 8. The game is said to have a value at (s, i, j) if
Vˇ i,js = Vˆ
i,j
s a.s. (2.6)
The common value V i,js , when it exists, is referred to as the game’s solution at (s, i, j).
When s = T we formally set Vˇ i,jT = Vˆ
i,j
T = h
i,j.
In this paper we construct a pair of controls (α∗, β∗) ∈ Ais×Bjs such that γ(α∗, β∗) ∈ Gi,js
and the game has a value V i,js = J
i,j
s (γ(α
∗, β∗)) (see Theorem 3.1 below). Such a result
was obtained in [17] under the assumption f i,j = f i1 + f
j
2 , h
i,j = hi1 + h
j
2 for (i, j) ∈ Γ.
Our result is obtained by dynamic programming and the connection between doubly
reflected backward stochastic differential equations (DRBSDEs) with implicitly defined
barriers and zero-sum optimal stopping games. We also prove the existence of optimal
non-anticipative strategies α∗ ∈ A is and β∗ ∈ Bjs which are robust in the sense that each
is a best response to the worst-case opponent.
2.3 Assumptions
Definition 9. For N ≥ 2 a loop in Γ of length N − 1 is a sequence {(i1, j1), . . . , (iN , jN)}
of elements in Γ with N − 1 distinct members such that (iN , jN) = (i1, j1) and either
iq+1 = iq or jq+1 = jq for any q = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Throughout this paper we make the following assumptions, which are closely related
to those in [17]:
Assumption 1. We impose the following conditions on the switching costs:
1. Non-negativity: min
i1∈Γ1
gˆi,i1 ≥ 0 and min
j1∈Γ2
gˇj,j1 ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Γ1, j ∈ Γ2.
2. Consistency:
(a) For all sequences {i1, i2, i3} ∈ Γ1 and {j1, j2, j3} ∈ Γ2 with i1 6= i2, i2 6= i3 and
j1 6= j2, j2 6= j3, we have for all t ∈ [0, T ],
gˆi1,i3t < gˆ
i1,i2
t + gˆ
i2,i3
t P-a.s. and gˇ
j1,j3
t < gˇ
j1,j2
t + gˇ
j2,j3
t P-a.s. (2.7)
(b) For all (i, j) ∈ Γ we have,
max
i1 6=i,i1∈Γ1
{hi1,j − gˆi,i1T } ≤ hi,j ≤ min
j1 6=j,j1∈Γ2
{hi,j1 + gˇj,j1T } P-a.s. (2.8)
3. Non-free loop property: For any loop {(i1, j1), . . . , (iN , jN)} in Γ we have for all
t ∈ [0, T ],
N−1∑
q=1
ϕq,q+1t 6= 0 P-a.s., (2.9)
where ϕq,q+1t = −gˆiq ,iq+1t 1{iq 6=iq+1} + gˇjq ,jq+1t 1{jq 6=jq+1}.
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3 A probabilistic verification theorem for the zero-
sum game
Theorem 3.1 uses the system (1.1) to prove the existence of a value for the zero-sum game.
Recall that m = |Γ| is the number of joint operating modes (i, j) ∈ Γ. For (i, j) ∈ Γ
define the lower and upper switching operators, Li,j : S2,mc → S2c and U i,j : S2,mc → S2c
respectively, as follows: for Y ∈ S2,mc ,L
i,j(Y ) = max
i1 6=i,i1∈Γ1
{Y i1,j − gˆi,i1},
U i,j(Y ) = min
j1 6=j,j1∈Γ2
{Y i,j1 + gˇj,j1}. (3.1)
Let L : S2,mc → S2,mc and U : S2,mc → S2,mc be the operators defined, using matrix notation,
by L = (Li,j)(i,j)∈Γ and U = (U i,j)(i,j)∈Γ. The following definition formalises the concept
of a solution to (1.1).
Definition 10. A solution to the system of DRBSDEs with terminal value h ∈ L2,m(FT ),
driver f ∈ H2,m, and implicit barriers L and U , is a triple (Y ,Z,K) ∈ S2,mc ×H2,m×K2,mc
such that a.s. for all (i, j) ∈ Γ and all 0 ≤ s ≤ T ,
(i) Y i,js = h
i,j +
∫ T
s
f i,jt dt+K
i,j
T −Ki,js −
∫ T
s
Zi,jt dBt ;
(ii) Y i,js ≤ U i,js (Y ) and Y i,js ≥ Li,js (Y ) ;
(iii)
∫ T
s
(Y i,jt − U i,jt (Y ))dKi,j,−t =
∫ T
s
(Li,jt (Y )− Y i,jt )dKi,j,+t = 0,
(1.1 revisited)
where Ki,j,+ and Ki,j,− are the increasing processes in the orthogonal decomposition
Ki,j := Ki,j,+ −Ki,j,−.
Note that for any solution to (1.1), the stochastic integral
∫ t
0
Zi,js dBs is well-defined,
and is a martingale belonging to S2c (see Chapter 3 of [21]).
Theorem 3.1. Suppose there exists a solution (Y ,Z,K) to the DRBSDE (1.1). For
every initial state (s, i, j) ∈ [0, T ]× Γ,
(i) Existence of value: the switching game has a value with,
Y i,js = V
i,j
s a.s. (3.2)
(ii) Existence of optimal controls: there exists a pair of controls (α∗, β∗) ∈ Ais × Bjs such
that γ(α∗, β∗) ∈ Gi,js and V i,js = J i,js (γ(α∗, β∗)) a.s.
(iii) Existence of optimal strategies: there exist non-anticipative strategies α∗ ∈ A is and
β∗ ∈ Bjs that are optimal in the robust sense:
ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α∗(β), β)
)
= ess sup
α∈A is
ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α(β), β)
)
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β∗(α))
)
= ess inf
β∈Bjs
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β(α))
)
Furthermore, these robust values are equal to the game’s value,
ess sup
α∈A is
ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α(β), β)
)
= V i,js = ess inf
β∈Bjs
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β(α))
)
.
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This concept of robustness, which is well known in the optimal control and differential
games literature [22, 23, 24], is natural in the context of zero-sum games [19].
Remark 3.2. Since the switching costs are non-negative we get the following type of
Mokobodski’s condition: there exists a system of processes w = {wi,j}(i,j)∈Γ belonging to
W2,mc such that for all (i, j) ∈ Γ: for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s.,
max
i1 6=i,i1∈Γ1
{wi1,jt − gˆi,i1t } ≤ wi,jt ≤ min
j1 6=j,j1∈Γ2
{wi,j1t + gˇj,j1t }. (3.3)
Indeed, by taking w to be the m-dimensional null process, w ≡ 0, it is easily verified that
w ∈ W2,mc and (3.3) holds. Mokobodski’s condition (3.3) is an extension of that typically
assumed for single-agent switching problems in a variety of settings [9, 11, 25, 26], or for
two-player Dynkin games or DRBSDEs [27, 28, 29, 30, 31], both of which are special,
somewhat degenerate, cases of the optimal switching game studied here.
Let us point out that for any solution (Y ,Z,K) to the DRBSDE (1.1), Y satisfies
Mokobodski’s condition (3.3) and, a posteriori, also belongs to W2,mc . Condition (3.3)
can therefore be seen as a feasibility check for the inequality constraint (1.1)–(ii): there
exists at least one system of processes Y which satisfies (1.1)–(ii) within a suitable class
of candidates. Actually, we know from the results in [30] that well-posedness of (1.1) is
intricately linked to Mokobodski’s condition (3.3).
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The existence of a solution to the DRBSDE (1.1) is closely related to the existence of both
a value and a Nash equilibrium in the following Dynkin game (see for example [28, 31, 32],
and also [18] for the relation to impulse control games with delay).
Proposition 3.3. Suppose there exists a solution (Y ,Z,K) to the DRBSDE (1.1). Then
for all (s, i, j) ∈ [0, T ]× Γ a.s.:
(a)
Y i,js = ess inf
τ∈Ts
ess sup
σ∈Ts
J i,js (σ, τ) = ess sup
σ∈Ts
ess inf
τ∈Ts
J i,js (σ, τ), (3.4)
where,
J i,js (σ, τ) := E
[∫ σ∧τ
s
f i,jt dt+ 1{τ<σ}U
i,j
τ (Y ) + 1{σ≤τ, σ<T}L
i,j
σ (Y )
∣∣∣ Fs]
+ E
[
hi,j1{σ=τ=T}
∣∣ Fs], (3.5)
and h, f , L and U are the data for (1.1) (see Definition 10).
(b) we have Y i,js = J i,js (σi,js , τ i,js ) where σi,js ∈ Ts and τ i,js ∈ Ts are stopping times
defined by, {
σi,js = inf{s ≤ t ≤ T : Y i,jt = Li,jt (Y )} ∧ T,
τ i,js = inf{s ≤ t ≤ T : Y i,jt = U i,jt (Y )} ∧ T,
(3.6)
and we use the convention that inf ∅ = +∞. Moreover, (σi,js , τ i,js ) is a Nash equilibrium
for the Dynkin game,
J i,js (σ, τ i,js ) ≤ J i,js (σi,js , τ i,js ) ≤ J i,js (σi,js , τ) ∀σ ∈ Ts and τ ∈ Ts. (3.7)
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Proof. Recalling the ordering (1.1)-(ii), the result follows from Proposition 2.2.1 of [32],
for example.
We will use Proposition 3.3 and a dynamic programming argument to first establish
claim (i) of Theorem 3.1, then obtain (ii) and (iii) as corollaries. Since (3.2) trivially
holds when s = T , let s ∈ [0, T ) and (i, j) ∈ Γ be arbitrary. Define a sequence (ρn, γn)n≥0
as follows,
ρ0 = s, γ0 = (i, j) and for n ≥ 1, (3.8)
ρn = σ
γn−1
ρn−1 ∧ τ γn−1ρn−1 , γn =

(Lγn−1ρn (Y ), γ(2)n−1), on M+n(
γ
(1)
n−1,Uγn−1ρn (Y )
)
, on M−n
γn−1, otherwise
(3.9)
where σγn−1ρn−1 and τ
γn−1
ρn−1 are defined using (3.6) above, Lγn−1ρn and Uγn−1ρn are obtained from
the switching selectors, 
Li,jt (Y ) ∈ arg max
i1 6=i,i1∈Γ1
{Y i1,jt − gˆi,i1t },
U i,jt (Y ) ∈ arg min
j1 6=j,j1∈Γ2
{Y i,j1t + gˇj,j1t },
(3.10)
and for n ≥ 1, M+n and M−n are the events,{
M+n =
{
σγn−1ρn−1 ≤ τ γn−1ρn−1 , σγn−1ρn−1 < T
}
,
M−n =
{
τ γn−1ρn−1 < σ
γn−1
ρn−1
}
.
Lemma 3.4. Under the conditions of Theorem 3.1 we have γ(α∗, β∗) ∈ Gi,js and Y i,js =
J i,js (γ(α
∗, β∗)) a.s., where α∗ = (σ∗n, ξ
∗
n)n≥0 and β
∗ = (τ ∗n, ζ
∗
n)n≥0 are sequences defined
from (ρn, γn)n≥0 as follows,
σ∗0 = τ
∗
0 = s, (ξ
∗
0 , ζ
∗
0 ) = (i, j) and for n ≥ 1, (3.11){
σ∗n = inf{t ≥ σ∗n−1 : u(1)t 6= ξ∗n−1} ∧ T, ξ∗n = u(1)σ∗n+,
τ ∗n = inf{t ≥ τ ∗n−1 : u(2)t 6= ζ∗n−1} ∧ T, ζ∗n = u(2)τ∗n+,
(3.12)
where u is defined using (2.3).
Proof. We begin by establishing that α∗ ∈ Ais. The non-free loop property (2.9) prevents
accumulation of the switching times ρ∗n, in the sense that P({ρ∗n < T ∀n ≥ 0}) = 0 (see,
for example, [33, pp. 192–193]). Since σ∗n ≥ ρn for n ≥ 0, it follows that P({σ∗n < T ∀n ≥
0}) = 0. Also, the consistency property (2.7) ensures that it is not optimal for a single
player to switch twice at the same instant, so we have σ∗n < σ
∗
n+1 on {σ∗n < T} for n ≥ 1
(see [9] or [33]). By the construction of α∗, noting that u(1)σ∗n+ is Fσ∗n-measurable since F is
right-continuous, the remaining parts of Definition 2 are satisfied, and α∗ ∈ Ais. Similarly
β∗ ∈ Bjs.
We now prove that γ(α∗, β∗) ∈ Gi,js by proceeding in a similar manner to [33]. Using
(1.1)-(i) and (1.1)-(iii) together with the construction of ρ1 gives P-a.s.,
Y i,js =
∫ ρ1
s
f i,jt dt+ h
i,j1{ρ1=T} + Y
i,j
ρ1
1{ρ1<T} +
∫ ρ1
s
dKi,j,+t −
∫ ρ1
s
dKi,j,−t −
∫ ρ1
s
Zi,jt dBt,
=
∫ ρ1
s
f i,jt dt+ h
i,j1{ρ1=T} + Y
i,j
ρ1
1{ρ1<T} −
∫ ρ1
s
Zi,jt dBt.
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By considering the first switch for either player we have
Y i,js =
∫ ρ1
s
f i,jt dt+
(
Y
γ
(1)
1 ,j
σi,js
− gˆi,γ
(1)
1
σi,js
)
1{σi,js <T}1{σi,js ≤τ i,js } +
(
Y
i,γ
(2)
1
τ i,js
− gˇj,γ
(2)
1
τ i,js
)
1{τ i,js <σi,js }
+ hi,j1{ρ1=T} −
∫ ρ1
s
Zi,jt dBt
=
∫ ρ1
s
futt dt+ Y
γ1
ρ1
1{ρ1<T} + h
γ01{ρ1=T} −
[
gˆγ
(1)
0 ,γ
(1)
1
ρ1
− gˇγ(2)0 ,γ(2)1ρ1
]
−
∫ ρ1
s
Zutt dBt,
(to account for the event {ρ1 = T}, recall that gˆi,it = gˇj,jt = 0). Proceeding iteratively for
n = 1, . . . , N we obtain by substitution
Y i,js =
∫ ρN
s
futt dt+
N∑
n=1
hγn−11{ρn=T, ρn−1<T} −
N∑
n=1
[
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn − gˇγ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn
]
+ Y γNρN 1{ρN<T} −
∫ ρN
s
Zutt dBt,
(3.13)
from which we obtain
C
γ(α∗,β∗)
N = Y
γN
ρN
1{ρN<T} − Y i,js +
∫ ρN
s
futt dt+
N∑
n=1
hγn−11{ρn=T, ρn−1<T}
−
∫ ρN
s
Zutt dBt. (3.14)
Let Mu = (Mut )s≤t≤T denote the stochastic integral M
u
t =
∫ t
s
Zurr dBr, which is a well-
defined square-integrable martingale on [s, T ] [21]. Continuing from (3.14) we have a.s.,
sup
N≥1
∣∣Cγ(α∗,β∗)N ∣∣ ≤ ∫ T
s
|futt |dt+ max
(i,j)∈Γ
|hi,j|+ |Y i,js |+ max
(i,j)∈Γ
sup
s≤t≤T
|Y i,js |
+ sup
s≤t≤T
|Mut |. (3.15)
The right-hand side of (3.15) is a square-integrable random variable, thereby proving
γ(α∗, β∗) ∈ Gi,js .
It is now straightforward to prove Y i,js = J
i,j
s (γ(α
∗, β∗)) a.s. by taking conditional
expectations in (3.13) then passing to the limitN →∞, which is justified since γ(α∗, β∗) ∈
Gi,js ,
Y i,js = E
[∫ T
s
futt dt+ h
uT −
∞∑
n=1
[
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn − gˇγ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn
] ∣∣∣ Fs]
= J i,js (γ(α
∗, β∗)). (3.16)
For a given α = (σn, ξn)n≥0 ∈ Ais, let β∗(α) = (τn, ζn)n≥0 be the control for player 2
defined similarly to (3.11) with the sequence (ρn, γn)n≥0 constructed by,
ρ0 = s, γ0 = (i, j) and for n ≥ 1, (3.17)
ρn = σrˇn ∧ τˇn, γn =

(
ξrˇn , γ
(2)
n−1
)
, on Mˇ+n(
γ
(1)
n−1,Uγn−1ρn (Y )
)
, on Mˇ−n
γn−1, otherwise
(3.18)
Continuous-time finite-horizon two-player zero-sum optimal switching games 12
where Uγn−1ρn is obtained from (3.10), τˇn := τ γn−1ρn−1 for n ≥ 1, {rˇn}n≥0 is defined iteratively
by rˇ0 = 0, rˇ1 = 1 and for n ≥ 2,
rˇn = rˇn−1 + 1{σrˇn−1≤ τˇn−1},
and for n ≥ 1, Mˇ+n and Mˇ−n are the events,{
Mˇ+n = {σrˇn ≤ τˇn, σrˇn < T},
Mˇ−n = {τˇn < σrˇn}.
In an analogous manner using the lower switching selector L(Y ) in (3.10), for each β ∈ Bjs
we define α∗(β) ∈ Ajs for player 1. The following lemma points out key properties of α∗
and β∗ utilised below to finish the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.5.
(i) We have α∗ ∈ A is and β∗ ∈ Bjs.
(ii) We have
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β∗(α))
)
= Y i,js = ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α∗(β), β)
)
. (3.19)
Proof.
Proof of (i): We only show β∗ ∈ Bjs since the proof that α∗ ∈ A is follows by similar
arguments. Just as in the proof of Lemma 3.4, the construction of β∗(α) together with
the no free-loop and consistency properties are sufficient to establish that β∗(α) ∈ Bjs
for each α ∈ Ais. Moreover, β∗ satisfies the non-anticipative property in Definition 4 by
construction. Let α ∈ Ais be given and let β∗(α) = β = (τn, ζn)n≥0 ∈ Bjs. To show that
this control is square-integrable we will proceed as in the proof of Lemma 3.4, to obtain
that a.s.,
Y i,js =
∫ ρ1
s
f i,jt dt+ h
i,j1{ρ1=T} + Y
i,j
ρ1
1{ρ1<T} +
∫ ρ1
s
dKi,j,+t −
∫ ρ1
s
dKi,j,−t −
∫ ρ1
s
Zi,jt dBt,
≥
∫ ρ1
s
futt dt+ h
i,j1{ρ1=T} −
[
gˆi,γ
(1)
1
ρ1
− gˇj,γ(2)1ρ1
]
+ Y γ1ρ1 1{ρ1<T} −
∫ ρ1
s
Zutt dBt,
where, in contrast to the proof of Lemma 3.4, here α is arbitrary and so γ
(1)
1 is not
necessarily optimal at time ρ1. This means the inequality L
i,j
ρ1
(Y ) ≤ Y i,jρ1 must be enforced
and the non-negative term
∫ ρ1
s
dKi,j,+t cannot be neglected. Proceeding iteratively for
n = 1, . . . , N it follows that
Y i,js ≥
∫ ρN
s
futt dt+
N∑
n=1
hγn−11{ρn=T, ρn−1<T} −
N∑
n=1
[
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn − gˇγ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn
]
+ Y γNρN 1{ρN<T} −
∫ ρN
s
Zutt dBt, (3.20)
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from which we obtain
N∑
n=1
gˇ
γ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn ≤ −
∫ ρN
s
futt dt−
N∑
n=1
hγn−11{ρn=T, ρn−1<T} +
N∑
n=1
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn
+ Y i,js − Y γNρN 1{ρN<T} +
∫ ρN
s
Zutt dBt. (3.21)
Since P({ρN < T ∀N ≥ 1}) = 0 the limits as N → ∞ on both sides of (3.21) are well
defined. As the switching costs are non-negative we have
0 ≤
∑
n≥1
gˇζn−1,ζnτn ≤ −
∫ T
s
futt dt− huT +
∑
n≥1
gˆξn−1,ξnσn + Y
i,j
s +
∫ T
s
Zutt dBt. (3.22)
Since α ∈ Ais, Y i,j ∈ S2c , hi,j ∈ L2(FT ), and f i,j, Zi,j belong to H2 for all (i, j) ∈ Γ, the
random variable on the right-hand side of (3.22) belongs to L2 and we conclude that the
control β is square-integrable.
Proof of (ii): We only show the first equality in (3.19) as the second follows via similar
arguments. We proceed by showing that for every α ∈ Ais we have,
Y i,js ≥ J i,js
(
γ(α, β∗(α))
)
. (3.23)
Taking conditional expectations in (3.20) above we get,
Y i,js ≥ E
[∫ ρN
s
futt dt+
N∑
n=1
hγn−11{ρn=T, ρn−1<T} −
N∑
n=1
[
gˆ
γ
(1)
n−1,γ
(1)
n
ρn − gˇγ
(2)
n−1,γ
(2)
n
ρn
] ∣∣∣ Fs]
+ E
[
Y γNρN 1{ρN<T}|Fs
]
. (3.24)
Using (i) above we have γ
(
α, β∗(α)
) ∈ Gi,js , so taking the limit N → ∞ in (3.24) proves
the inequality (3.23).
Next, for each integer k ≥ 0 let α∗k denote the truncation of the control α∗ from
Lemma 3.4 to the first k switches: α∗k =
(
σ∗n, ξ
∗
n)0≤n≤k with (T, ξ
∗
k) appended. Then
α∗k ∈ Ais for each k and J i,js
(
γ
(
α∗k, β∗(α
∗
k)
))→ J i,js (γ(α∗, β∗(α∗))) by the non-anticipative
properties of β∗ and as γ
(
α∗, β∗(α∗)
) ∈ Gi,js . The claim
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β∗(α))
)
= Y i,js ,
is then proved by passing to the limit k →∞ in,
J i,js
(
γ
(
α∗k, β∗(α
∗
k)
)) ≤ ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β∗(α))
) ≤ Y i,js ,
and using Lemma 3.4.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of (i) and (ii): By construction we have α∗ = α∗(β∗) and β∗ = β∗(α∗) so that,
by Lemma 3.4,
Y i,js = J
i,j
s
(
γ(α∗, β∗)
)
= J i,js
(
γ(α∗(β∗), β∗)
)
= J i,js
(
γ(α∗, β∗(α∗))
)
, (3.25)
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and by Lemma 3.5,
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β∗(α))
)
= Y i,js = ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α∗(β), β)
)
.
Since β∗(α) ∈ Bjs for every α ∈ Ais and α∗(β) ∈ Ais for every β ∈ Bjs, almost surely we
have,
Vˆ i,js := ess inf
β∈Bjs
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β)
) ≤ Y i,js ≤ ess sup
α∈Ais
ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α, β)
)
=: Vˇ i,js ,
which completes the proof since Vˆ i,js ≥ Vˇ i,js a.s.
Proof of (iii): For all α ∈ A is we have a.s.,
ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α(β), β)
) ≤ ess inf
β∈Bjs
ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β)
)
= Y i,js = ess inf
β∈Bjs
J i,js
(
γ(α∗(β), β)
)
,
and the corresponding statement for β∗ is proved analogously. Since α∗ ∈ A is and β∗ ∈ Bjs
the proof is complete.
Remark 3.6. In proving Theorem 3.1 we established the following. For players 1 and 2
respectively there exist non-anticipative strategies α∗ and β∗ as well as controls α∗ and β∗
which satisfy the following,
• the controls α∗, β∗ and non-anticipative strategies α∗, β∗ are related by α∗ = α∗(β∗)
and β∗ = β∗(α∗);
• α∗ and β∗ are jointly admissible;
• when player 2 (the minimiser) uses the non-anticipative strategy β∗, then the use
of the control α∗ by player 1 (the maximiser) gives the maximum possible value
for the switching game over all controls α such that (α, β∗(α)) is jointly admissible,
including all square-integrable controls α;
• when player 1 uses the non-anticipative strategy α∗, then the use of the control
β∗ by player 2 gives the minimum possible value for the switching game over all
controls β such that (α∗(β), β) is jointly admissible, including all square-integrable
controls β;
• the strategies α∗ and β∗ are best responses in the robust sense [22, 23, 24].
Let us emphasise that α∗ is not necessarily a best response strategy in the sense,
J i,js
(
γ(α∗(β), β)
)
= ess sup
α∈Ais
J i,js
(
γ(α, β)
) ∀β ∈ Bjs,
and correspondingly for β∗. In the game with initial data (s, i, j), for player 1 we can
define a mapping α : Bjs → Ais such that for each β ∈ Bjs a.s.,
J i,js
(
γ(α(β), β)
) ≥ J i,js (γ(α, β)) a.s. ∀α ∈ Ais,
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but this mapping is generally not non-anticipative since its output α(β) can depend on
the entire trajectory corresponding to the input β. For example, define the following
objective for player 1,
J˜ is(α; β) = E
[∫ T
s
f˜
u
(1)
t
t dt−
∞∑
n=1
gˆξn−1,ξnσn + h˜
u
(1)
T
s,T
∣∣∣ Fs] , α ∈ Ais, β ∈ B, (3.26)
V˜ is (β) = ess sup
α∈Ais
J˜ is(α; β),
where u(k), defined analogously to (2.3), indicates the current mode selected by player
k = 1, 2, and for i ∈ Γ1 and t ∈ [s, T ], f˜ it := f i,u
(2)
t
t and h˜
i
s,T := h
i,u
(2)
T +
∑∞
n=1 gˇ
ζn−1,ζn
τn 1{τn≥s}.
Using the results in [9, 17], we can prove the existence of value processes
(
V˜ it (β)
)
s≤t≤T ,
i ∈ Γ1, and an optimal control in Ais for each i ∈ Γ1. The non-anticipativity issue arises
from the dependence of (3.26) on the expected future rewards due to player 2’s switching
decisions.
3.2 The diffusion framework
Recall the process Xs,x introduced in (1.2) where (s, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rk. Suppose that b
and σ are deterministic continuous functions with values in Rk and Rk×d respectively,
Lipschitz with respect to x uniformly in t. Consequently, the process Xs,x exists and is
unique (see [34]). Next assume that for any (i, j) ∈ Γ, k ∈ Γ1, ` ∈ Γ2 and t ∈ [s, T ],
f i,jt = f¯
i,j(t,Xs,xt ), h
i,j = h¯i,j(Xs,xT ), gˆ
i,k
t = ˆ¯g
i,k(t,Xs,xt ) and gˇ
j,`
t = ˇ¯g
j,`(t,Xs,xt )
where the functions f¯ i,j, h¯i,j, ˆ¯gi,k and ˇ¯gj,` are deterministic, continuous and of polynomial
growth with respect to x. We then have:
Theorem 3.7 (see [17]). Assume that:
a) the functions h¯i,j, ˆ¯gi,k and ˇ¯gj,`, (i, j) ∈ Γ, k ∈ Γ1, ` ∈ Γ2, verify the properties of
positivity, consistency and non-free loop of Assumption 1.
b) The functions ˇ¯gj,`, j, ` ∈ Γ2 or ˆ¯gi,k, i, k ∈ Γ1 are C1,2 and their derivatives are of
polynomial growth.
Then there exists a system of processes (Y i,j, Zi,j, Ki,j)(i,j)∈Γ which satisfy (1.1) on [s, T ],
and for any (i, j) ∈ Γ, Y i,jt , t ∈ [s, T ] verifies (3.2) and (2.6). Moreover, there also exist
deterministic continuous functions with polynomial growth (vi,j(s, x))(i,j)∈Γ such that for
any (i, j) and t ∈ [s, T ],
Y i,jt = v
i,j(t,Xs,xt )
and (vi,j(s, x))(i,j)∈Γ is the unique solution in viscosity sense of system (1.3).
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